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WHEN GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION COLLIDES WITH 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Martha McCarthy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 25, 2009, the United States Supreme Court 
rendered its widely watched decision in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum. 1 Unanimously reversing the opinion of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the city's 
decision to reject a religious group's request to erect a 
monument in a public park even though a monument with the 
Ten Commandments was already displayed. The Court 
concluded that the city's decision as to which donated 
monuments to display represents government expression that 
is not subject to Free Speech Clause restrictions. The Court in 
this case avoided addressing 1) whether a city's expression of 
its own views by allowing the display of monuments with 
religious content, such as the Ten Commandments, promotes 
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, and 2) 
whether there is a legitimate justification for cities to display 
monuments of some religious groups but not others.2 Following 
a brief introduction and review of the recent Supreme Court 
decision, this article addresses the potential conflict between 
the government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause 
and implications of this conflict for public schools. 
* Chancellor's Professor and Chair, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, 
Indiana University. 
1. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) [hereinafter Summum]. 
2. Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision, a number of Utah cities removed 
Ten Commandments monuments rather than allow the Summum to place monuments 
in the parks. See Kristen Moulton, Church-State Battle Looms Over Monuments in 
Parks, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www .scrippsnews.com/node/41282. 
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A. Context and Lower Court Litigation in the Summum Case 
The controversy focused on monuments in a public park in 
Pleasant Grove City, which has approximately 31,000 residents 
who predominantly adhere to the Mormon faith. Pleasant 
Grove's Pioneer Park displays 15 monuments, 11 of which were 
donated by private groups. In 1971, the city council voted to 
accept a monument of the Ten Commandments from the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles that had established a local chapter 
in the city two years earlier. Primarily in the 1960s, the Eagles 
distributed Ten Commandments monuments to more than 100 
cities for the purpose of reducing juvenile delinquency by 
promoting this moral code. 3 Summum, through President 
Summum Ra, requested permission in 2003 to erect a 
monument depicting the Seven Aphorisms of Summum to join 
the Ten Commandments and other donated monuments in 
Pioneer Park. Summum is a religious organization founded in 
1975 as an offshoot of Christianity, and adherents claim that 
their seven principles were inscribed on the first set of tablets 
Moses received at Mt. Sinai before he received the Ten 
Commandments.4 In rejecting Summum's request in 2003 and 
again in 2005, the city argued that only monuments related to 
the city's history or donated by groups with longstanding ties 
with the city were allowed to be displayed in the park and that 
the Summum monument did not meet either criterion.5 
Summum brought suit in 2005, claiming a free speech right 
to erect the monument in Pioneer Park. The federal district 
court rejected the claim, but the Tenth Circuit reversed that 
decision.6 Considering such monument displays to be private 
expression, the appeals court applied strict judicial scrutiny 
and concluded that the Summum monument could not be 
excluded unless there was a compelling government reason 
that did not entail viewpoint discrimination. 7 The Tenth 
3. The Eagles started distributing these monuments in conjunction with the 
release of the Ten Commandments movie in 1956. 
4. See Warren Richey, Court to Weigh Utah Sect's Monument, CHRISTIAN Sc. SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 12, 2008, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/lll2/p03s05· 
usju.html. 
5. Summum. 129 S. Ct. at 1130. 
6. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, Utah, 483 F.3d 1044 (lOth Cir. 2007), 
petition for rehearing en bane denied, 499 F.3d 1170 (lOth Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 
1125 (2009). See also Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (lOth Cir. 2002); infra 
text accompanying note 28. 
7. Summum, 483 F.3d at 1054-55. 
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Circuit considered a public park to be a public forum not only 
in terms of content-based restrictions on private speech but 
also on the display of permanent monuments accepted from 
private donors. Finding it unlikely that the city would satisfy 
strict scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit granted the requested 
injunction against the city so the Summum monument could be 
erected.8 
B. Supreme Court Summum Decision 
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision.9 
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Alito declared that 
"[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property 
typically represent government speech," which is not subject to 
strict scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 10 The Court 
reasoned that the First Amendment restricts government 
regulation of private speech but not government speech. 11 
Recognizing that a park may constitute a public forum for 
speeches and other transitory expressive activities, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that forum analysis does not apply to 
the erection of a permanent monument. 12 
The Court concluded that when a city accepts a monument 
from a private donor the monument becomes the government's 
expression of its own message. Citing the International 
Municipal Lawyers Association's amicus brief in Summum, the 
Court noted that "[a]cross the country, 'municipalities 
generally exercise editorial control over donated monuments 
through prior submission requirements, design input, 
requested modifications, written criteria, and legislative 
approvals of specific content proposals."' 13 
8. !d. at 1055. 
9. Summum, 129 8. Ct. 1125. 
10. !d. at 1132. 
11. !d. 
12. !d. at 1137. Public places, such as streets and parks, are considered a 
traditional public forum for communication where content restrictions cannot be 
imposed without a compelling government interest. In a nonpublic forum, such as a 
public school, expression can be confined to the governmental purpose of the property. 
The government can create a limited public forum for expression on public property 
that otherwise would be a nonpublic forum. For a discussion of forum analysis, see 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n 
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 
(6th Cir. 2001). 
13. Summum, 129 8. Ct. at 1133 (quoting Brief for IMLA as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 21, Summum, 129 8. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665)). 
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The Court acknowledged that a park plays an important 
role in conveying a city's identity and concluded that cities can 
accept monuments portraying views they want to express as 
their own, while rejecting others that do not mesh with their 
ideas. 14 The Court declared: "City parks-ranging from those 
in small towns, like Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, to 
those in major metropolises, like Central Park in New York 
City-commonly play an important role in defining the identity 
that the city projects to its own residents and to the outside 
world." 15 Essentially, the government has the right to "speak 
for itself' and to "say what it wishes." 16 The Court recognized 
that public parks may provide soapboxes for a range of 
speakers, but that it would be unrealistic to open parks to the 
display of all monuments any person or group proposed. 
However, the Court did acknowledge that government speech 
is not totally unrestricted. For example, as will be discussed, it 
must comply with the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause even though the Court was not asked to address this 
topic in Summum. 17 
C. Concurring Decisions 
Four concurring opinions were written to express support 
for the Court's holding but with slightly different reasoning. 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, voiced displeasure 
with the relatively new government speech doctrine and urged 
the Court to avoid any expansion of this doctrine. But he 
concluded that this case does not represent such an expansion 
since there is "no retaliation for, or coercion of, private speech" 
or the likelihood that the government will "be able to avoid 
political accountability for the views that it endorses or 
expresses through this means." 18 Justice Stevens further 
emphasized that the Constitution's other prohibitions, 
including those in the Establishment and Equal Protection 
14. Id. at 1131, 1134. 
15. Id. at 1133-34. 
16. Id. at 1131 (citations omitted). 
17. Id. at 1132. In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter emphasized that the 
Establishment Clause issue was not briefed nor argued before the Supreme Court. 
Summum's appeal was based solely on the Free Speech Clause. See id. at 1141 (Souter, 
J., concurring); see also infra note 28. 
18. Id. at 1139 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). 
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Clauses, ensure that the government does not have "free 
license to communicate offensive or partisan messages." 19 
In the second concurrence, Justice Breyer interpreted the 
government speech doctrine more expansively. He cautioned 
that the government speech doctrine should not be viewed as a 
rigid category, but instead, the purpose of the doctrine must be 
considered and not just the labels such as "government speech" 
or "public forum." 20 
In the third concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, wrote separately to mention the Establishment 
Clause issue even though it was not addressed in the Court's 
opinion. Justice Scalia noted that this "case has been litigated 
in the shadow of the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause."21 He relied on the Supreme Court's 2005 decision, 
upholding the display of a Ten Commandments monument on 
the Texas capitol grounds, as substantiating that the Ten 
Commandments have an historical meaning that insulates 
such monuments from an Establishment Clause challenge. 22 
In the final concurrence, Justice Souter accepted the 
government speech doctrine but noted that its interaction with 
the Establishment Clause has not yet been sufficiently 
explored and may be difficult to reconcile.23 He opined that if 
all monuments are viewed as government speech and some 
have religious overtones, then the Establishment Clause may 
be implicated.24 He proposed adopting a "reasonable observer" 
standard, which is similar to that used to assess whether the 
government is endorsing religion.25 Under this standard, the 
central question is whether a reasonable observer would view 
the monuments as government expression instead of private 
speech that is merely allowed on public land. If so, the 
expression would represent the government and would be 
shielded from strict scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 
19. /d. 
20. Td. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
21. /d. at 1139 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). 
22. /d. at 1140 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)). 
23. /d. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring only in judgment). 
24. /d. at 1141-42. 
25. /d. at 1142. 
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II. CAN THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE BE RECONCILED 
WITH ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROHIBITIONS? 
The government speech doctrine has an intuitive appeal. It 
is logical for the government to be able to speak for itself 
without being subjected to strict scrutiny under the Free 
Speech Clause.26 The government at times takes positions (e.g., 
stealing is bad; teenage alcohol use should be curtailed) or 
promotes subjects that it feels are in the best interests of the 
citizenry (e.g., the elimination of child abuse). It would be 
difficult for the government to function properly without the 
protection of perspectives it wants to promote in the interest of 
the general welfare. 
A. Government Versus Private Expression 
Several federal appellate courts have applied a four-factor 
test to evaluate whether expression should be considered 
government speech. Under this test, consideration is given to 
(1) the central purpose of the expression, (2) the extent that the 
municipality exerts editorial control, (3) the speaker's identity, 
and (4) whether the municipality has final authority for the 
content of the expression.27 In Summum v. City of Ogden, the 
Tenth Circuit applied these four factors in finding a Ten 
Commandments monument in a public park and a proposed 
Summum monument for the park to be private, not 
government, speech.28 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the 
26. In Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005), two associations of 
beef producers and some individuals asserted that television ads were private speech 
because they were funded through compelled assessments of beef producers and the 
government solicited assistance from the Cattleman's Beef Promotion and Research 
Board in developing the ads. Disagreeing, the Supreme Court held that the ads were 
government speech because the message was controlled by the government in that the 
Secretary of Agriculture had final approval. 
27. See Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.::ld 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008); Wells v. 
City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (lOth Cir. 2001); Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (8th Cir. 2000); see also 
Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 32 (2008). 
28. 297 F.3d 995, 1004-05 (lOth Cir. 2002). In finding the Ten Commandments 
monument to be private speech, the appeals court focused on the purpose of the 
monument-to advance the donor's viewpoint that the Ten Commandments provide an 
appropriate moral code for youth to adopt. The court also reasoned that the city had no 
editorial control over the content because the monument was presented as a finished 
product. This decision motivated Summum to rely on the Free Speech Clause in the 
claim involving Pleasant Grove City. 
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city could not discriminate against selected private religious 
perspectives in authorizing which monuments to display. 
The Tenth Circuit espoused similar reasoning in the recent 
Summum case, but the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the 
decision to display monuments in a city park to be protected 
government expression.29 As discussed, government expression 
is not subjected to strict scrutiny, but the U.S. Constitution 
does place restrictions on government speech that are not 
placed on private expression. Paramount among these is that 
government expression cannot blatantly discriminate against 
certain perspectives or promote religious tenets. Whereas 
private religious expression is protected by the Free Speech 
Clause, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government 
from promoting religion. 
B. Public Monuments as Government Expression 
Interpreting the government speech doctrine in connection 
with monuments on public property, the Supreme Court has 
reasoned that when the public entity accepts a private donation 
it assumes ownership of the message as well as the physical 
monument that is permanently displayed. 30 Thus, monuments 
in city parks convey the government's views, and the general 
citizenry sees the government as the speaker. If a public park 
instead were considered a public forum where viewpoint 
discrimination is barred when deciding which monuments to 
display, the city would not be able to shape its parks to reflect 
local values. 
The government makes choices in expressing its ideas, and 
there is always some element of viewpoint discrimination in 
such decisions. For example, when a school board decides who 
will be the graduation speaker, many possible speakers are 
excluded from consideration. 31 Also, when public libraries 
decide to purchase certain books, they are not selecting many 
others. Similarly, the government must be able to select certain 
monuments for its parks; it cannot accept all that are proposed 
because there simply would not be enough space, and having 
too many monuments might defeat the park's purpose. Jay 
29. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132-33. 
30. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134; see also Dolan, supra note 27. 
31. Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing 
Order Out of Chaos of Free Speech Cases Inuoluing School-Sponsored Activities, 542 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 737-38 (2009). 
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Sekulow, in his brief for Pleasant Grove City, stated that 
"[a]ccepting a Statue of Liberty does not compel a government 
to accept a Statue of Tyranny."32 As noted previously, the Court 
in Summum agreed that most cities exert control over the form 
and content of donated monuments through guidelines they 
promulgate or through a required approval process.33 The 
Court has recognized that when the government is promoting 
its own policies it has latitude in designing its message and "it 
may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its 
message is neither garbled nor distorted."34 
C. Can Religious Views Be Government Expression? 
The primary unresolved issue after the Supreme Court's 
2009 Summum decision is how the acceptance of some religious 
monuments and the rejection of others can comply with the 
Establishment Clause if such acceptance conveys the views of 
the government. The attorney representing Summum, Brian 
Barnard, has amended the lawsuit in federal court, focusing 
the new claim on the Establishment Clause. Voicing optimism 
that he will be successful in challenging the differential 
treatment of the Seven Aphorisms and the Ten 
Commandments under the Establishment Clause, he has 
asserted that given the Supreme Court's decision, "it's like they 
are handing it to me on a silver platter."35 If a city's decision to 
accept or reject donated monuments is government speech, 
then how can a municipality allow either a Ten 
Commandments monument or one with the Summum's Seven 
Aphorisms, since both promote religious tenets on behalf of the 
city? 
The government is prohibited by the Free Speech Clause 
from discriminating against private religious views, but the 
government itself cannot endorse religious messages.36 Stated 
another way, Ian Bartrum has asserted that Justices "Scalia 
and Thomas cannot have their constitutional cake and eat it 
32. Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665). 
33. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (citing Brief for IMLA as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 21; Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665)). 
34. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
35. Moulton, supra note 2. 
36. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
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too: If there is room at the public forum for the Good News 
Club, there must also be room for Summum."37 Thus, the park 
is either a forum for expression where viewpoint discrimination 
would not be allowed, or the monuments are government 
expression, which is restricted by the Establishment Clause. It 
is difficult to argue that Pleasant Grove City's action speaks for 
the government AND complies with the Establishment Clause. 
The American Humanist Association contends that the 
Summum decision provides a vehicle to use the Establishment 
Clause in requiring the removal of all Ten Commandments 
monuments from public property. 38 Justice Souter, in his 
Summum concurrence, recognized that the Establishment 
Clause issues were not raised in this case and that "the 
interaction between the 'government speech doctrine' and 
Establishment Clause principles has not yet begun to be 
worked out."39 And he noted that it "may not be easy to work 
out,"40 which is an understatement indeed. 
Justice Scalia, in his Summum concurrence is the only 
justice who directly addressed the Establishment Clause issue, 
and he quickly rejected the concern. He opined that "[t]he city 
ought not fear that today's victory has propelled it from the 
Free Speech Clause frying pan into the Establishment Clause 
fire."41 He contended that the Ten Commandments can 
legitimately be displayed because they have historical 
significance in addition to their religious meaning. But on other 
occasions, he has stated that the government can even promote 
biblical monotheism without implicating the Establishment 
Clause,42 which the Supreme Court has rejected in a number of 
decisions. 43 
Since the foundation of the government speech doctrine is 
that the government controls its message, a "constitutional 
37. Ian Bartrum, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 
95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 43, at 46 (2009). 
38. See Brief for American Humanist Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665). 
39. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring). 
40. ld. 
41. ld. at 1139 (Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring). 
42. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891-94 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also Dolan, supra note 27, at 48 n.232. 
43. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 220 ( 1963). 
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conundrum" presents itself whenever this doctrine is applied to 
religious speech.44 And the display of a permanent monument 
with religious content differs from a public official making a 
religious reference in a speech. Not only is a speech transient, 
but also the public realizes that the speaker is expressing 
personal views. In contrast, a monument that is permanently 
displayed gives a "collective statement of government 
approval."45 
D. Are the Ten Commandments Secular? 
The only way to avoid an Establishment Clause violation 
would be to consider the religious monument to be primarily 
historical and secular, rather than sectarian. Calling this "a 
flimsy doctrine fraught with peril," Bartrum has contended 
that "it transparently prefers well established or 'historically 
significant' religions-likely to be local majorities-to newer 
minority groups."46 
The Supreme Court seemingly settled the religious nature 
of the Ten Commandments in Stone v. Graham when it struck 
down a state's efforts to post the Ten Commandments in public 
school classrooms.47 The Court was not persuaded that the 
constitutional violation was reduced by purchasing the copies 
with private donations and including the following notation on 
each copy: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments 
is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of 
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United 
States."48 The Court recognized that the first three 
commandments outline duties of believers toward God so they 
cannot be viewed as a secular code of conduct. The Court 
declared that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a 
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no 
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us 
to that fact."49 
44. Dolan, supra note 27, at 48. 
45. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
46. Bartrum, supra note 37, at 47. 
47. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
48. KY. REV. STAT.§ 158.178 (1980). 
49. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. The Court further stated that posting the 
Commandments was designed "to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, 
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments." ld. at 42. 
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Even when the splintered Supreme Court in 2005 upheld 
the display of a donated Ten Commandments monument50 on 
the Texas state capitol grounds in Van Orden v. Perry, the 
Court indicated that Stone was still good law. 51 And on the 
same day that Van Orden was rendered, the Court in another 
divided ruling struck down the display of the Ten 
Commandments in Kentucky county courthouses, finding the 
displays designed to promote religion.52 
Nonetheless, the five-member Van Orden majority found 
the display of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas 
state capitol grounds to be a far more passive use of the 
religious document than when the Ten Commandments are 
displayed in public schools. 53 Because the state had accepted 
monuments representing several aspects of the state's political 
and legal history and the Ten Commandments were found to 
have historical as well as religious significance, the Van Orden 
majority could not conclude that the display of the Ten 
Commandments monument violated the Establishment Clause. 
However, the four dissenting justices in Van Orden strongly 
disagreed, noting that "the sole function of the monument on 
the grounds of Texas's State Capitol is to display the full text of 
50. See supra text accompanying note 3 for a discussion of monuments donated by 
the Fraternal Order of Eagles. 
51. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690·91. 
52. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); see also Baker v. Adams 
County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 86 Fed. Appx. 104 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding an 
unconstitutional religious purpose in displaying the Ten Commandments on the 
grounds of new high schools, noting that other historical monuments were added to the 
displays only after the religious monuments were legally challenged); ACLU v. City of 
Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (fmding religious motives in the city's 
accepting and maintaining a Ten Commandments monument); Books v. Elkhart, 235 
F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding a Ten Commandments monument in front of a 
municipal building to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion). In supporting 
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Books, Justice Stevens declared that the 
first line of the monument's inscription (I am the Lord thy God) could not possibly he 
defended as religiously neutral. Books, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001). 
53. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 678; see also ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of 
Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (en bane) (upholding a Ten Commandments 
display in a public park as recognizing the role of God and religion in our nation's 
history); Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(upholding the display of the Ten Commandments on a plaque attached to a county 
courthouse because it is viewed as an historical artifact); Summum v. City of Ogden, 
297 F.3d 995 (lOth Cir. 2002) (finding no Establishment Clause violation in the display 
of a Ten Commandments monument and the proposed display of a Summum 
monument in a city park since both entailed private expression); supra text 
accompanying note 28. 
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one version of the Ten Commandments."54 Justice Stevens 
contended that by choosing one version, the selection put the 
state in the middle of a sectarian dispute. 55 He further faulted 
the majority for condoning the promotion of a code of conduct 
through biblical teachings, which "injects a religious purpose 
into an otherwise secular endeavor."56 He declared that "[i]f a 
state may endorse a particular deity's command to 'have no 
other gods before me,' it is difficult to conceive of any textual 
display that would run afoul of the Establishment Clause."57 
The Van Orden dissenters argued that the state could honor 
the Fraternal Order of Eagles for its efforts to combat juvenile 
delinquency without using a religious medium. Justice Stevens 
observed that there was no connection between the Ten 
Commandments monument and the state's history or any 
individual or group; instead, any reasonable observer would 
view the monument as state endorsement of Judea-Christian 
religion. He asserted: "This Nation's resolute commitment to 
neutrality with respect to religion is flatly inconsistent with the 
plurality's wholehearted validation of an official state 
endorsement of the message that there is one, and only one, 
God." 58 
If the Establishment Clause demands neutrality, then the 
government cannot advance any religious faith, despite Justice 
Scalia's contention that monotheism can be promoted.59 The 
state clearly cannot privilege those religious sects that are 
based on a belief in God.60 The Supreme Court also has 
recognized that individuals have the right to select any religion 
or none at all. 61 
It is difficult to argue that the government is not embracing 
the majority religion when it displays a monument of the Ten 
Commandments. Does the Supreme Court's decision in 
Summum stand for the premise that the government can 
promote Judea-Christian religious views but it can reject the 
views of other "fringe religions," as they do not convey tenets 
54. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 707 (Stevens, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
55. Id. at 718-19. 
56. ld. at 715. 
57. Id. at 735. 
58. Id. at 712. 
59. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891-94 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 42. 
60. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
61. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985). 
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that the government embraces?62 The American Jewish 
Committee, Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, and several other groups, in an amicus brief in 
Summum, argued that the case should be litigated under 
Establishment Clause principles because the Summum 
actually are claiming that the city acted with religious hostility 
in refusing to display the monument. 63 Assuming that 
monuments in public parks represent the views of the 
government, additional ammunition is provided for a successful 
Establishment Clause suit if any of the monuments are 
religious in nature. Chief Justice Roberts even recognized this 
dilemma during the Summum oral arguments: "You're really 
just picking your poison. . . the more you say that the 
monument is Government speech to get out of the ... Free 
Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you're walking into a 
trap under the Establishment Clause. If it's Government 
speech, it may not present a free speech problem, but what is 
the Government doing speaking-supporting the Ten 
Commandments?"64 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUMMUM DECISION FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
At first blush, it may appear that the implications of the 
Summum ruling for public education are minimal. The most 
apparent connection is in interpreting free speech guarantees. 
When public schools are speaking as the government, they are 
not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny. In a nonpublic 
forum, such as a public school, the government daily makes 
decisions regarding the curriculum to adopt, books to use, and 
speakers to invite that preclude consideration of other topics, 
materials, and individuals. The recent attention given the 
government speech doctrine has not changed the legal 
principles applied in assessing the public school's expression of 
its own messages. 
62. Dolan, supra note 27, at 49. 
63. American Jewish Committee, Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Anti-Defamation League, Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, and 
People for the American Way Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665). 
64. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-
665). 
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However, one could argue that the recently articulated 
government speech doctrine may strengthen, and perhaps even 
expand, the principle enunciated in Hazelwood School District 
u. Kuhlmeier. 65 The Supreme Court in Hazelwood announced 
that expression representing the public school can be curtailed 
for legitimate pedagogical reasons. But the Hazelwood 
principle was alive and well before the government speech 
doctrine became prominent. It is not likely that public schools 
have more latitude using the government expression rationale 
than they already have under Hazelwood, a decision that has 
been expansively interpreted as covering both employee and 
student expression that bears the imprimatur of K-12 public 
schools or state-supported postsecondary institutions.66 
The major implication of the Summum decision for public 
schools may be a subtle one, assuming that the Supreme Court 
continues to uphold Ten Commandments displays in city parks, 
while at the same time allowing cities to reject monuments 
from other religious groups. This may provide an incentive for 
public schools to further accommodate the dominant religious 
faith in their communities. For example, they may conclude 
that bricks donated for a public school sidewalk can include 
religious messages supported by the majority of the 
community, such as references to God, because such messages 
are considered the school's expressiOn and convey that 
historically our nation's citizenry has professed a belief m 
God. 67 Public schools may interpret the Summum decision as 
65. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
66. See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood to a 
university's assessment of a student's academic performance); Henerey v. City of St. 
Charles Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding disqualification of student 
council candidate who handed out condoms with stickers bearing his campaign slogan); 
Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773 (lOth Cir. 1991) (upholding disciplinary 
action against a teacher who made comments during class about rumors that two 
students had engaged in sexual intercourse on school grounds during the lunch hour); 
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (llth Cir. 1991) (upholding a university's order to a 
professor to keep religious beliefs out of the classroom). 
67. Courts to date have rendered conflicting rulings on requests to include 
religious messages on bricks purchased for school walkways or on tiles hung at school. 
See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (lOth Cir. 2002) 
(upholding school authorities in barring religious messages on tiles to be hung at school 
because such expression represents the school and sectarian tiles would promote 
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause); Kiesinger v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. 
Sch., 427 F. Supp. 2d 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding viewpoint discrimination in 
removing from the school walkway donated bricks with references to Jesus since 
secular references were allowed); Seidman v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 
327 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Ariz. 2004) (finding viewpoint discrimination in the school 
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giving them more autonomy in determining what perspectives 
they will project. 
Public schools in some locales might even resurrect efforts 
to display the Ten Commandments on school grounds, 
contending that such displays are permissible government 
speech. It would appear that if a Ten Commandments 
monument in a city park is permissible because it reflects the 
government's views and does not run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause due to its historical significance, the Ten 
Commandments could be displayed in public schools as well. 
Why would such displays abridge the Establishment Clause 
only in certain settings? Is the historical and secular 
significance of the Ten Commandments lessened when posted 
in public schools?68 The argument used to justify the secular 
nature of the Ten Commandments does not seem context 
specific. The emphasis given to government expression and the 
types of speech it protects could alter how public schools 
respond in certain situations until the intersection of the 
government speech doctrine with the Establishment Clause IS 
resolved by the Supreme Court. 
IV. Conclusion 
Government-commissioned monuments can speak for the 
government but so can privately funded monuments that the 
government accepts as donations. Few fault the utility of this 
strategy. Under the government speech doctrine, a 
municipality accepts selected monuments so it can project a 
particular image to all who visit the park, and the expression 
then becomes that of the government entity.69 The argument 
developed here is that a government unit, whether a city or 
public school, cannot use "historical acceptance" or "ties to the 
allowing parents to purchase tiles for school walls with motivational phrases but not 
religious references). 
68. Granted, courts traditionally have been particularly protective of public school 
students in applying the Establishment Clause, but some recent decisions have 
preferred Free Speech Clause analysis to bar governmental discrimination against 
private religious expression. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 
98 (2001) (allowing a Christian organization to hold meetings in a public school right 
after classes end even though the evangelical club targets elementary-agP. children 
attending the school); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (rejecting an 
Establishment Clause challenge to the Equal Access Act that allows student religious 
clubs to meet in federally assisted secondary schools that have created a forum for 
student groups to meet during noninstructional time). 
69. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
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community" rationales to accept a monument from a religious 
group it favors and reject a monument from a religious group it 
does not support. Otherwise, as Justice Stevens has noted, "[i]t 
would replace Jefferson's 'wall of separation' with a perverse 
wall of exclusion-Christians inside, non-Christians out."70 If 
the government speech doctrine is dominant and overrides the 
Establishment Clause, "[t]his makes a mockery of the 
constitutional ideal that government must remain neutral 
between religion and irreligion."71 It seems inevitable that the 
United States Supreme Court will have to address the collision 
of the Establishment Clause and the government speech 
doctrine in the near future. 
70. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 730 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. at 735. The concept of governmental neutrality toward religion has 
changed since first addressed in the mid.twentieth century. Initially, neutrality meant 
complete separation of church and state: "Neither a state nor the Federal government 
can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Now, the concept of neutrality 
has a more accommodationist connotation, often cloaked in terms of private religious 
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 
Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see 
also Bartrum, supra note 37. 
